

**Department of the Army Response to the National Defense Authorization
Act; Section 2827 (a)**

**National Defense Authorization Act Section 2827 (a)
Report on Pinon Canyon
Maneuver Site**



**Headquarters, Department of the Army
Response to
The National Defense Authorization Act 2007
Section 2827 (a)**

Table Of Contents

<u>PART 1: Overview of the Army Training Land Strategy</u>	<u>Pages</u>
1.1 Purpose	3
1.2 Introduction	3-7
1.3 Fort Carson Background	7-8
<u>PART 2: Specific Responses to Section 2728(a) Information Requests</u>	
2.1 Section 2827(a)(2)(A)- Description of the Current and Projected Military Requirements at the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site	8-12
2.2 Section 2827(a)(2)(B)- Analysis of the Reasons for Changes in Training Requirements	12-16
2.3 Section 2827(a)(2)(C)- Proposed Plan for Addressing Training Requirements Shortfalls	17-21
2.4 Section 2827(a)(3)- Additional Elements	21-23
Reference Documents Related to this Action	24

PART 1: Overview of the Army Training Land Strategy

1.1 Purpose

This report has been developed by the Department of the Army in response to Congressional direction contained in Section 2827(a) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Public Law 109-364 (2007 NDAA). This report provides information in fulfillment of 2007 NDAA §2827(a) and 2007 NDAA §2827(b) pertaining to the Army's training requirements at Fort Carson and Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site (PCMS) in Colorado. The report requirements for 2007 NDAA §2827(c) will be submitted at a later date under a separate cover. In this document, the Army will provide details concerning current and future projected training requirements of units to be stationed at Fort Carson; underlying causes for changes to unit training requirements; and alternatives that have been preliminarily examined to meet training requirements shortfalls.

1.2 Introduction

The Army Campaign Plan (ACP) provides direction for detailed planning, preparation, and execution of the full range of tasks necessary to provide relevant and ready land power to the Nation while maintaining the quality of the all-volunteer force. The Army is pursuing the most comprehensive transformation of its forces since the early years of World War II, however the Soldier remains the centerpiece of our combat systems and formations. Support for Soldiers, civilians and their families are a critical part of the Army's ability to defend our Nation.

Army Transformation and implementation of the ACP significantly increase the Army's requirement for training land while urban and environmental encroachment simultaneously are decreasing the amount of training land available for use by Army units and Soldiers. The Army needs large, doctrinally-sound training areas to support the ACP and the National Military Strategy. The 2003 Army Range and Training Land Strategy (RTL) provides a strategic framework for the acquisition of training land. During a 2004 program review, the Army informed Congress of a service-wide training land shortfall of over five million acres. The Army has taken several steps to reduce its training land shortfall.

As the Army transforms, units at all levels are required by doctrine to operate across a larger battle space. The result of an increased doctrinal battle space requirement is that the Army is facing greater needs for training land.

Technological advances, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Stryker Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV), and Battle Command Systems (BCS) create the capability to detect targets and conduct operations over more terrain than ever before. The Army must exploit these technological advantages by training Soldiers, leaders, and units to exercise their equipment to the fullest capabilities, while operating across large areas in a unified and decisive manner.

Stationing changes directed by BRAC 05 will concentrate Army units and service schools at key installations in the United States. Recent changes in the Army's global posture and readiness cycles have increased the pressure on Army land assets. The Global Defense Posture Realignment (GDPR) is moving units from overseas locations to the United States. This movement adds to the need for training land because there are no new Army installations being created in the United States. In addition, the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) requires units to train to a higher level at home station because Army units must meet readiness gates at a faster pace than ever before. ARFORGEN-based training increases the emphasis on home station collective training. This, in turn, increases installation training requirements because collective training events are large in order to parallel actual operations while deployed.

Along with doctrinal-based and stationing-based increases in land, the Army Future Combat System (FCS) creates a *technology-based* increase in the requirement for training land. As part of the Transformation effort, the Army is working at a rapid pace to develop and field more technologically advanced systems to enhance combat capabilities. These systems, currently referred to as FCS, require Army units at all echelons to exploit the capabilities of improved technology to conduct operations over larger areas. The Army anticipates that the FCS will require an area of operations that will be up to 75 km X 75 km for a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). This projected FCS land requirement represents an 18-fold increase in training land requirements when compared with a current modular BCT. Although the Army has not designated where the FCS systems will be fielded, all BCTs, including those stationed at Fort Carson, will receive "spin-out" systems from the FCS as soon as the technology becomes available. The Army plans to begin issuing FCS "spin-out" technologies as early as 2009.

While the Army's requirement for training land grows, the capacity of and accessibility to Army lands is decreasing. There are significant challenges that must be actively addressed to sustain training on Army land. The Army is competing with its neighbors for access to land, airspace, and frequency spectrum. Urbanization and urban sprawl are encroaching on military lands and creating "islands of biodiversity" on Army installations. Urbanization concentrates endangered species and their habitat on areas traditionally used for military training. Increases in the concentration of endangered species at Army installations, causes increased environmental restrictions. Environmental restrictions tend to translate into reduced accessibility to training land.

The Sustainable Range Program (SRP) integrates Army programs to maximize the capability, availability, and accessibility of ranges and training land to support live training and testing requirements. When possible land is used on a rotational basis to allow the land to recover from maneuver damage, when resting the land is not possible, the Army uses Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM) to repair maneuver damage. ITAM a component of SRP focuses on fixing maneuver repair and sustainability of training land so that irreversible or permanent damage is not done to maneuver training land. In 2003, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G-3, approved the *Range and Training Land Strategy* (RTLS) as a component of the SRP. The purpose of the RTLS is to address the increasing land deficit facing the Army. The RTLS serves as the mechanism to prioritize Army training land investment, and helps to optimize the use of all Army range and training land assets. The RTLS provides a long-range plan for the Army to provide the best range infrastructure and training land to units.

The RTLS was developed in five phases. The first phase was to inventory current Army training assets. The inventory was completed in 2002 and covered nearly 500 active and reserve component installations. The second phase examined land values, parcel ownership, environmental constraints, environmental requirements, and population trends from public records to identify opportunities for training land acquisition and buffering. The third phase analyzed available land data to recommend short-term and long-term opportunities based on Army priorities. The RTLS process is designed to ensure that Army planners continually reevaluate against the ACP, so that any investment decisions will match stationing changes. The fourth phase was the establishment of planning objectives and the identification of installations where land acquisition supports the ACP. The key to this phase was to ensure that any land acquisition effort was feasible, affordable, and manageable in terms of environmental restrictions. Because of the timing of this fourth phase, the Army was able to inform BRAC stationing recommendations, with respect to training land, indicating where land deficits may be mitigated through long-term investment and management. The fifth and final phase was to evaluate public attitudes and provide outreach support to specific land acquisitions. Fort Carson was identified as an outreach candidate during this phase of the RTLS process.

The deliberate phases of the RTLS provide the framework for the Army to select the most appropriate course of action to address training land shortfalls at specific Army installations. The options that the Army can pursue include: focused management to maximize existing land holdings, buffering through partnerships, utilization of other Federal lands where possible, and land acquisition.

Focused management: The Army SRP continually strives to maximize the capability, availability, and accessibility of all Army training lands, but the RTLS may indicate that a land shortfall can be addressed using internal Army or

Federal Government mechanisms. An example of this approach can be seen at Fort Bliss where the Army reassessed the traditional relationship between the Fort Bliss mission and White Sands Test Range mission to enable more training activities on the White Sands Range, and thereby mitigate training burdens on Fort Bliss lands. Another example of focused management is at Fort Stewart, where the Army is investing in land management practices that convert un-maneuverable swamp lands to maneuver-enabled training areas by installing wetland-friendly crossing sites and maneuver corridors. Unfortunately, the use of focused management does not always provide a solution to an installation's training land deficit so the Army must look at other alternatives.

Buffering through Partnerships: Army Compatible Use Buffers (ACUBs) allow the Army to preserve or enhance an installation's current training land capabilities by influencing land uses outside the installation. By forming partnerships, the Army can deter encroachment by securing off-installation land-use agreements that are compatible with Army training. ACUBs serve to insulate Army training from encroachment and can be used to reduce environmental restrictions to training. Land buffers are very effective and generally popular among local communities, but ACUBs are not always available as a viable option to mitigate critical training land deficits.

Utilization of other Federal Lands: The Army will look to the land status of other Federal entities to mitigate land deficits at Army installations. Land that borders Army installations, and is held by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or Fish and Wildlife Service, may be transferred or leased to the Army after a comprehensive approval process that includes NEPA and other public reviews. Fort Polk utilizes US Forest Service (USFS) land under a special use permit. While not all training activities are permitted on USFS, the special use permit allows Army training on an additional 98,000 acres.

Land Acquisition. In some circumstances, the Army will pursue the purchase of land to mitigate training land deficiencies. The current Army position is to purchase land only where it is feasible, operationally sound, affordable, and compatible with environmental conditions and requirements. The land acquisition approach is only pursued at an installation when it is clearly established as the best solution for supporting Army training requirements to meet ACP goals. In the last three years, the Army has acquired training land at Fort Bragg, NC (~10,580 acres), Fort Irwin, CA (Phase I ~49,000 acres), and in Hawaii (~24,000 acres).

The key to any successful Army land action or stationing change is a comprehensive public outreach effort. Without a clear, consistent message from the Army the public will often rely on information that is speculative or inaccurate. As such, the Army needs to maintain public trust and credibility by disclosing intended courses of action as soon as possible. On the other hand, prior to engaging in public outreach for land acquisition, the Army has an obligation to

ensure land acquisition proposals are consistent with DoD priorities. The Department of Defense (DoD) has a restriction on communications concerning any specific land acquisition proposal until a waiver to its land acquisition moratorium is granted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This DoD restriction ensures that each acquisition is reviewed in context of overall DoD requirements and resources. Although this policy is a logical outgrowth of the need to ensure acquisitions achieve valid management objectives, its effect may be to raise public suspicion that the Army is holding back information from the public. To counter this perception, the Army needs to emphasize that no decisions on land acquisition can be made until comprehensive public outreach is conducted, to include completion of the environmental analysis required under the NEPA process.

1.3 FORT CARSON & PINON CANYON MANEUVER SITE

Fort Carson is located to the south of Colorado Springs, Colorado, and to the east of the Rocky Mountain Front Range. Fort Carson occupies portions of El Paso, Pueblo, and Fremont counties and is bounded by Colorado Highway 115 to the west and by Interstate 25 to the east. Fort Carson is approximately 137,000 acres and contains a cantonment area (housing and facilities), live-fire ranges, and maneuver training land. The Fort Carson is considered one of the Army's premier training installations and will support approximately 23,000 Soldiers after the implementation of stationing directives issued in 2005.

PCMS is a maneuver training facility of approximately 235,000 acres that is under the command and administrative responsibility of Fort Carson. PCMS is located in Las Animas County in the southeast corner of Colorado approximately 150 miles to the southeast of Fort Carson (see Figure 1-1 below). PCMS is bounded by Colorado Highway 350 to the west, the Purgatoire River Canyon to the east, Van Bremer Arroyo to the south, and the Otero County line to the north. Nearby cities and towns include Trinidad and Model to the southwest, and La Junta and Timpas to the northeast.




Figure 1-1. PCMS Location Reference Map

The Army combines Fort Carson and PCMS when calculating unit training requirements and available training lands. Fort Carson and PCMS share the mission of providing Fort Carson’s Soldiers with the facilities, infrastructure, and training space needed to complete doctrinally required training. PCMS is the primary maneuver area for units stationed at Fort Carson. PCMS has only minimal cantonment infrastructure and provides units with training areas that are significantly larger than the training areas at Fort Carson. The training areas at PCMS are the only training areas in the vicinity of Fort Carson that can support Battalion Task Force and BCT maneuver training requirements. Since August 1985, Fort Carson units have used PCMS to conduct field-training exercises, including readiness certification exercises, battalion task force maneuver exercises, and force-on-force training exercises. Units also use PCMS to conduct BCT level operations in preparation for rotations at the National Training Center, which is the final large-scale training event before deployment to Iraq.

PART II: SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO SECTION 2728(a)

2.1 Section 2827(a)(2)(A). A description of the current and projected military requirements at the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site

Army Transformation and stationing initiatives are being implemented to maximize the effectiveness of United States combat forces and achieve greater efficiencies in military basing, by better aligning Soldiers with the resources they

need to execute their military training activities. In 2005, the 109th Congress and the Armed Forces announced stationing initiatives to relocate troops to priority installations. Shortly thereafter, Fort Carson was selected as one of the Army's strategic priority installations and designated a Power Projection Platform (PPP). Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 and the GDPR stationing initiatives directed that two additional Brigade Combat Teams be stationed at Fort Carson. Concurrent with the execution of these stationing actions, the Army also began to implement its Army Modular Forces (AMF) and Army Transformation concepts to ensure a standard, Army-wide organizational structure based around the BCT. AMF decisions moved the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) from Fort Carson to Fort Hood. As part of the Transformation effort, the Army is working at a rapid pace to develop and field more technologically advanced systems to enhance combat capabilities.

2.1.1 Fort Carson/PCMS Training Requirements in 2005

In 2005, Fort Carson and PCMS supported three major tenant units, as well as training requirements to support units in the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard. The major tenant units included the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (3-4 ID), the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR), and the 10th Special Forces Group, Airborne (10th SFG(A)). The total annual average population of Soldiers training at Fort Carson and PCMS was approximately 14,500 Soldiers. These Soldiers conducted or supported the training of 78 ground-based combat maneuver platoons and the 10th SFG(A). Analysis of training space requirements for units training at Fort Carson and PCMS was conducted in 2004. The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) used a standard HQDA model to calculate the total number of range facilities and training land acres needed to support units at a given installation. The model, based on doctrinal training standards defined in Army Training Circular (TC) 25-1, *Training Land*, and TC 25-8, *Training Ranges*, calculates the number of doctrinally required training events needed to certify units for operational deployments. The model multiplies each training event by the duration of the event and the number of units requiring training. This model requires the scheduling of training lands by multiple units for various training events simultaneously to achieve full utilization. Training requirements analysis conducted in 2004 concluded that the units stationed at Fort Carson/PCMS required 276,606 acres of training space to support training operations. Table 2-1 below shows the total amount of training space required by each of Fort Carson's/PCMS units prior to the 2005 stationing decisions.

Unit	Acres
3 BCT, 4th ID	66,222
3rd ACR	108,724
10th SFG (A)	42,500
Other Units	59,160
Total	276,606

Table 2-1 *Training Space Requirements of Fort Carson's Units 2004*

The Army model then considers actual Fort Carson/PCMS land assets on hand. Table 2-2 below shows the inventoried land assets at Fort Carson and PMCS. Note that not all acres on Fort Carson/PCMS are capable of supporting training. Fort Carson has 80,775 acres that support doctrinal maneuver training. The PCMS has 224,842 acres that support doctrinal maneuver training. Combined, the training land available to the units at Fort Carson is 305,617 acres.

	Fort Carson	PCMS	Combined
Total Acreage	146,421	235,300	381,721
Restricted Acreage	65,646	10,458	76,104
Available Training Acreage	80,775	224,842	305,617

Table 2-2 *Training Space Available to Fort Carson's Units*

From an analytical perspective, using the Army's land requirements model, the combined Fort Carson/PMCS training capability in 2005 exceeded the training requirement by 29,011 acres. It must be noted that this "surplus" does not represent actual land or unused acreage. The surplus is the product of an analytical model and must be viewed in that context.

2.1.2 Projected Training Requirements for Fort Carson and PCMS

The simultaneous implementation of Army Transformation and stationing directives proposed as part of the GDPR and BRAC generate a significant increase in the Army's projected training land requirements at Fort Carson and PCMS. Specific analysis of each factor leading to the projected increase in training land requirements will be presented in the response to section 2827(a)(2)(B).

The factor causing the largest increase in the Army's training land requirements is the Army transformation to a Modular Force. The Army's doctrinal requirements increased significantly, because traditional organizations were subdivided and augmented to create greater numbers of highly mobile fighting units. In other words, Army units are transforming from "bigger and slower to smaller and faster". Better technologies, new training doctrine, and a shift in a focus from the Battalion level to the BCT level has resulted in more than 143 percent increase in the amount of training space needed to support a BCT.

In order to capture the total change in projected training space requirements, the Army used a standard model to calculate training space and training range to meet new doctrine. Training requirements analysis indicate that following the implementation of the Modular Force, GDPR, and BRAC stationing directives, units stationed at Fort Carson are projected to require a total of 724,241 acres of training land. Table 2-3 below illustrates the total amount of training space doctrinally required by each of Fort Carson's units following the implementation of Transformation, GDPR, and BRAC stationing. These actions will result in the stationing of the 4th Infantry Division, (consisting of three identical heavy BCTs, one infantry BCT), the 10th SFG(A), and other support units at Fort Carson, CO.

Unit	Acres
1 BCT, 4th ID HV (Moved from Fort Hood)	161,457
2 BCT, 4th ID LT (Formerly 2 nd ID BDE)	138,093
3 BCT, 4th ID HV (Existing at FT Carson)	161,457
4 BCT, 4th ID HV (New from Modularity)	161,457
10th SFG (A)	42,500
Other Units	59,160
Total	724,124

Table 2-3. *Projected Training Space Requirements following the implementation of Army Modular Transformation, GDPR, and BRAC 05*

2.2 Section 2827(a)(2)(B). Analysis of the Reasons for any Changes in Training Requirements

As directed by 2007 NDAA §2827(a)(2)(B), this section of the report will address the factors contributing to the overall training requirements increase at Fort Carson and PCMS. Following the order of §2827(a)(2)(B), this section of the report will show how BRAC 05, Army Transformation, and GDPR individually and collectively result in an increase.

2.2.1 Section 2827(a)(2)(B)(i). [Analysis of the Reasons for any Changes in Training Requirements including the extent to which the changes are the result of–] an increase in military personnel using the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site due to decisions made as part of the 2005 round of BRAC;

The BRAC 2005 legislation resulted in the stationing of one new BCT and the addition of a 2-star Unit of Employment (UEX) command headquarters to the existing mission support requirements of Fort Carson and PCMS. The BRAC 2005 legislation increased the number of Soldiers conducting training at Fort Carson and PCMS by approximately 4300.

The effects of BRAC 2005 decisions on training land requirements discussed here are analyzed independently of Army Transformation or modularity initiatives. Table 2-4 (below) depicts the effects of BRAC 05 decisions on the training land requirements of Fort Carson and PCMS.

Unit	Acres
1 BDE, 4 th ID HV (Moved from Fort Hood)	66,222

Table. 2-4 Additional Training Space Requirements Needed to Support BRAC 05 Decisions (Without Conversion to Modular BCTs or GDPR)

The BRAC 2005 legislation increases the doctrinal training space (required at Fort Carson and PCMS by 66,222 acres) by moving a Brigade (BDE) from Fort Hood to Fort Carson. When the BDE is modularized, the requirement will increase to 161,457 acres. This will be discussed further in section 2.2.2.

2.2.2 Section 2827(a)(2)(B)(ii). [Analysis of the Reasons for any Changes in Training Requirements including the extent to which the changes are the result of–] the conversion of Army brigades to a modular format;

In October 1999, the Army Senior Leadership expressed a new vision regarding future readiness and force structure of the Army needed to meet the changing global challenges of the 21st Century. The major elements of the Army’s plan for Transformation are the standardization of unit structure to modular BCTs, the consolidation of command and control functions, an increase in reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and the integration of new technology and equipment to make the Army more deployable, flexible, lethal, and adaptive. The on-going implementation of Transformation and Modularity has resulted in significant changes to Army training doctrine and training support requirements.

Under the Modular Force, the live training priority shifts to combined arms training at the BCT level, a higher echelon of unit training. This shift in training doctrine substantially increases the amount of land required to conduct realistic combined arms training. In addition to maintaining the BCT level of training proficiency, units will increasingly train using technology which allows for greater physical dispersion. To exploit the advantages of new technology, units are required to conduct operations while separated by greater distances. Figure 2-2 below visually depicts the doctrinal maneuver areas required by a BCT before and after modularity transposed on the footprint of PCMS (Army Training Circular TC 25-1, *Training Land*).




Figure. 2-2 Training Space Requirements of a BCT before and after Modularity

In 2005, the Army TRADOC conducted an analysis of Army training requirements for a Modular BCT. The analysis, based on the Army's standard land requirements model, was recalibrated to take into account the training requirements of the Modular Force. The projected recalibrated training requirements showed that a transformed Modular BCT would require 161,457 acres of maneuver training area. When compared to the previous requirement of 66,222 acres for a traditional BDE, this new requirement represents a 143 percent increase. Figure 2-3 shows the training space requirements of the Modular BCT in comparison to a previously existing BCT.




Figure. 2-3 Training Space Requirements of Fort Carson's Units Prior to and Following Implementation of Modularity

The implementation of modularity is the factor responsible for the largest change in training land requirements at Fort Carson/PCMS. Army transformation

decisions moved the 3rd ACR from Fort Carson/PCMS to Fort Hood, reducing the maneuver training land requirement, while the BDE's at Fort Carson modularization increased their requirement for maneuver training land. At the same time, a BCT was established at Carson. The 3rd ACR is larger, both in terms of manpower and training acreage requirements, than the BCT that replaced it. This change meant a slight decrease in requirements at Carson PCMS. The impacts of transformation changes for Fort Carson/PMCS are displayed below in Table 2-5.

Unit	Acres pre-modularity	Acres/after modularity
1 BCT, 4th ID HV (Moved from Fort Hood BRAC)	66,222	161,457
3 BCT, 4th ID HV (Existing at FT Carson)	66,222	161,457
4 BCT, 4th ID HV (New from Modularity)	0	161,457
3rd ACR	108,724	0

Table 2-5. Fort Carson's Modular Training Space Requirements

When analyzing the projected effects of transformation in conjunction with GDPR and BRAC 05 stationing decisions, the cumulative training land requirements increase greatly. Over half of this training acreage requirement increase can be attributed to increased training land requirements resulting from new Transformation and Modular Force training doctrine. These are the primary factors leading to projected training land shortfalls at Fort Carson and the PCMS.

Fort Carson and PCMS have a total available training acreage of 305,617. Available training acres are not capable of fully supporting the doctrinal training requirements resulting from the conversion of Fort Carson's units to Modular BCTs.

2.2.3 Section 2827(a)(2)(B)(iii). [Analysis of the Reasons for any Changes in Training Requirements including the extent to which the changes are the result of–] the Integrated Global Presence and basing Strategy (now called the Global Defense Posture Realignment (GDPR)).

GDPR, previously referred to as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), is the blueprint of recommendations outlining the size, character, and location of long-term overseas force presence. GDPR recommendations were developed before the initiation of formal 2005 BRAC activities, as part of an inter-agency assessment of the DoD's long-term overseas

force projection and basing needs. On the basis of the GDPR recommendations, the Secretary of Defense announced that approximately 50,000 Soldiers currently based overseas would return to the United States between 2004-2011. GDPR decisions in 2005 relocated the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division (2-2ID) from Korea to Fort Carson.

GDPR stationing decisions will result in an overall addition of one Infantry BCT (2-2ID) from Korea to the mission support requirements of Fort Carson and PCMS. GDPR decisions increase the number of Soldiers conducting training at Fort Carson and PCMS by approximately 3500. Increased training land requirements from GDPR are listed below in Table 2-6.

Unit	Acres
2 BCT, 4th ID LT (Formerly 2 nd ID BDE)	138,093

Table 2-6 *Training Requirements Imposed by GDPR (Without Conversion to Modular BCT)*

Thus, GDPR stationing decisions increase the training land requirement at Fort Carson/PCMS by 138,093 acres. The 2nd BDE, 2nd ID will already be transformed when it arrives at Fort Carson/PCMS. The training land requirement for the BCT was less prior to its modularity actions. Note that this is an Infantry BCT. It needs less training space than the other BCTs.

2.2.4 Section 2827(a)(2)(B)(iv-v). [Analysis of the Reasons for any Changes in Training Requirements including the extent to which the changes are the result of–] high operational tempos or surge requirements;

The Department of the Army does not factor high operational tempos, or surge requirements into its analysis of training requirements or stationing. Stationing and Transformation are long-term initiatives designed to support and sustain the force well into the 21st Century. Given the comparatively short timelines within which policy decisions and specific military operations typically occur, it would not be prudent for the US Army to assume that a high operational tempo of unit deployments will be sustained. This assumption would place those units stationed at Fort Carson at risk of not having enough training resources in the future, should the pace of operations and deployments slow. Therefore, the Army conducts training requirements planning based on a peacetime assumption that all units are at home station and available to conduct training. Similarly, training requirements planning is not based on surge conditions. Planning based on short-term, sporadic surges could result in large areas of training land that are unused most or all of the time.

2.3 Section 2827(a)(2)(C). Proposed Plan for Addressing Training Requirements Shortfalls

The US Army recognizes that it faces a large doctrinal training land shortfall at Fort Carson and PCMS, necessary to fully implement training of the transforming Army. Table 2-7 below outlines the training space requirements before and after the implementation of Army Transformation, BRAC, and GDPR. Given the fact that Fort Carson and PCMS share 305,617 acres of available maneuver land, the installation and its maneuver site are projected to experience a total training land shortfall of 418,507 acres (724,124 acres - 305,617 acres) in order to meet the 724,124 acre doctrinal requirement following the implementation of transformation initiatives and stationing directives.

Unit	Requirement Before AT/BRAC/GDPR	Requirement After AT/BRAC/GDPR	Difference Between Requirements
1 BCT, 4th ID HV (Moved from Fort Hood)	0	161,457	161,457
2 BCT, 4th ID LT (Formerly 2 nd ID BDE)	0	138,093	138,093
3 BCT, 4th ID HV (Existing at FT Carson)	66,222	161,457	95,235
4 BCT, 4th ID HV (New from Modularity)	0	161,457	161,457
3rd ACR	108,724	0	-108,724
10th SFG (A)	42,500	42,500	0
Other Units	59,160	59,160	0
Total Land Requirement (Acres)	276,606	724,124	447,518

Table 2-7. Maneuver Land Requirement in Acres Before and After Implementation of Transformation/Modularity, BRAC 05, and GDPR

While the Army does not have the authority to pursue land expansion without obtaining an OSD waiver from the DoD’s major land acquisition moratorium, the Army has analyzed several courses of action, listed below, to remedy it’s training land shortfall as referenced in the Alternative Analysis Study (AAS). Under the current authority within the Army, Alternatives A, B and E can potentially be implemented. These alternatives are being analyzed in the Fort

Carson/PCMS Transformation EIS. If the Army is given approval to pursue a potential land acquisition, the Army would be able to develop a detailed plan, identify specific site locations, engage the public, and conduct the detailed studies and documentation required by law in order to reach a preferred alternative and eventually a final decision.

Alternate A - Utilize Existing Training Space at Carson and PCMS to Best Meet Training Requirements.

Alternate B - Transportation of Soldiers and their Equipment to other Training Facilities.

Alternate C - Purchase Private Lands and Transfer Public Lands in the Proposed Area Surrounding PCMS.

Alternate D - Purchase/Lease smaller, Non-contiguous Sites around PCMS.

Alternate E - Utilize Existing Land and Increase Utilization of Virtual and Constructive Training in Order to Meet Requirements.

Alternate F - Expand Fort Carson Proper.

2.3.1 Alternative A – Utilize Existing Training Space at Carson and PCMS to Best Meet Training Requirements.

This alternative represents the decision to utilize the current training lands to the maximum extent possible, within the constraints of sustainability and applicable environmental regulations. This alternative would not allow current and future units to train to doctrinal standards of the transforming force, and training requirements would have to be modified to achieve proficiency in mission critical tasks. This alternative will not allow troops to utilize the full operational capability of their equipment and will place them at risk when deployed in operational theatre. In addition, the inability to rest and recover training lands from more concentrated training impacts is projected to lead to a greater potential degradation of natural resources at Fort Carson and PCMS.

2.3.2 Alternative B – Transporting Soldiers and their Equipment to Other Training Facilities

This alternative would entail training units to standard as much as possible at Fort Carson and PCMS and then moving off-site to complete collective training at other Army training lands. A significant problem with this transportation alternative is that the available training sites (including, but not limited to: Camp Guernsey, Wyoming; Yakima, Washington; and Gowen Field, Idaho) all suffer from significant space limitations and/or restrictions on the frequency and duration of maneuver training permitted. The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin CA, while otherwise large enough, is heavily scheduled for Mission Readiness Exercises for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, and is not readily available to support the training cycles of Fort

Carson's units. With modular transformation leading to a greater number of US based BCTs, there will be greater numbers of units competing for training time at NTC. Outside of NTC, there are no existing training areas in the vicinity of Fort Carson that provide the doctrinally required maneuver space at the frequency needed for combat proficiency. Aside from the feasibility of finding a suitable location to execute this alternative, sending Soldiers and their equipment to other training facilities such as NTC would be significantly more expensive than training to standard at an expanded home station. The cost of a training rotation at NTC is approximately 40 percent more expensive than a robust force-on-force training event at home station.

2.3.3 Alternative C – Purchase Private Lands and Transfer Public Lands in the Proposed Area Surrounding PCMS

The alternative to purchase private lands and/or transfer public lands in the proposed area surrounding PCMS offers increased training options that could potentially meet the training requirements of units stationed at Fort Carson. This alternative could potentially allow units to train over doctrinal distances for units up to the modular BCT level. There are large parcels of relatively undeveloped land of a nature similar to the lands already used for training at PCMS. Acquiring lands adjacent to PCMS would allow efficiencies, including the use of Fort Carson for the necessary housing, administrative, and quality of life infrastructure for assigned Soldiers.

2.3.4 Alternative D – Purchase/Lease Smaller, Non-contiguous Sites around Fort Carson or PCMS

This alternative has the potential to acquire enough aggregate land to train current and future forces, however, the non-contiguous nature of the acquired land limits its usefulness to conduct large-scale training at the modular BCT level. The management of numerous, small training areas will require more manpower and resources, thus being less efficient than one large, contiguous training area.

2.3.5 Alternative E – Utilize Existing Land and Increase Utilization of Virtual and Constructive Training in Order to Meet Requirements.

While simulations have improved tremendously in recent years, they do not replicate the human factors involved in maneuvering within and controlling doctrinal battle space. Virtual and constructive training have a valuable place in the early phases of unit training, but do not adequately replicate the stress of live training required before units are certified to operationally deploy. Only live training can encompass all the different Battlefield Operating Systems, while adequately introducing the unpredictability of human behavior and the external environment into a training event.

2.3.6 Alternative F – Expand Fort Carson Proper

This alternative proposes the purchase of land adjacent to Fort Carson. Unfortunately, the surrounding communities are already densely populated and allow little room for expansion. The only potentially available land is adjacent to Fort Carson's southern boundary. This small parcel would not off-set any significant portion of Fort Carson's training land requirement. Additionally, Fort Carson has already initiated actions to encumber these lands within an Army Compatible Use Buffer in which development rights to the land are ceded in perpetuity in order to create a buffer against future civilian encroachment.

2.3.7 Description of Proposed Plans for Addressing Training Requirements

At this time, the Department of the Army is pursuing Alternative A (preferred alternative for Fort Carson/PCMS Transformation EIS) to best utilize existing resources to meet the training requirements of units scheduled for stationing at Fort Carson. The impacts of this alternative are currently being analyzed in the Fort Carson and PCMS Transformation Draft Environmental Impact Statements. This approach will likely incorporate increased utilization of virtual and constructive training simulations (Alternative E) and the use of NTC (Alternative B) wherever possible to minimize the impacts of the projected training land shortfall. This hybrid approach will offer the Soldiers of Fort Carson the best currently foreseeable opportunity to reach acceptable levels of training proficiency before they must operationally deploy.

In the Spring of 2006, the Army submitted a request to OSD for a waiver from the DoD's major land acquisition moratorium to pursue Alternative C, land expansion at the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site. The request, if approved, would allow the Army to gather information, develop a detailed plan, and solicit public input to begin analysis of the capability and potential for land expansion contiguous to PCMS to accommodate the training needs of Fort Carson's Soldiers. Approval of this request by OSD would allow the Army to begin engaging the public and allow the Army to formulate alternatives to pursue land acquisition.

The Army has conducted limited analysis to support its request for a waiver from DoD. Such analysis includes a Land Use Requirements Study conducted in 2004 and an AAS which investigated and attempted to identify viable alternatives to land expansion in order to meet Fort Carson's projected training shortfalls. As stated above, considerably more effort and input will be required before a final expansion decision will be made. Only after OSD

approval is granted, can the Army begin working with the public to conduct analysis on the feasibility of any specific land acquisition actions in the vicinity of Fort Carson or PCMS. The Army would also be required by law to prepare and thoroughly consider an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The EIS would solicit public input to formulate alternatives and include in-depth analysis of the need for any acquisition as well other possible alternatives. This document would also analyze the potential environmental and socio-economic consequences resulting from any land expansion alternatives. Only if and when alternatives have been formulated with public input and thoroughly analyzed and considered as required by NEPA, would any final decision on expansion be made within the Department of Defense. Any decision by DoD could only be executed through Congressional approval of the necessary funding.

2.4 SECTION 2827(a)(3). *Additional Elements.*

The information discussed in this section is required by Section 2827(a)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The Army, however is unable to conduct detailed analysis of any potential land acquisition at this time; and because of this an action to expand PCMS remains purely speculative in nature. As described above, there is a detailed series of steps that must be followed before a decision may be made to proceed with expansion. The Department of the Army is committed to complying, in good faith, with each of those steps.

In the spring of 2006, the Army submitted a “proposal” to OSD requesting the approval to analyze in detail the viability of land acquisition to support the projected training land shortfalls at Fort Carson. This proposal has not been approved at this point in time. OSD has not yet made a decision on the Army’s request. If OSD grants approval and authorizes the Department of the Army to investigate the feasibility of expanding PCMS, as stated above, the Army would then begin the process of gathering information, conducting analysis, and working with the public through procedures directed by NEPA to develop informed alternatives which take public concerns into consideration.

2.4.1 SECTION 2827(a)(3)(A). *Assessment of Economic Impact of Expanding the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site by Acquiring Privately Held Land Surrounding the Site.*

NDAA Section 2827(a) (3)(A) directs that the Department of the Army conduct an assessment of economic impacts on the local community if land expansion at the PCMS is recommended as the Army’s preferred alternative. As stated above, action to gather information and solicit public input to analyze and develop alternatives to expand the PCMS is not possible at this time and remains purely speculative in nature. If OSD were to grant the Army the authority to

investigate PCMS expansion alternatives in the future, the Army would proceed by developing informed alternatives with consideration of documented public input as directed by NEPA.

2.4.2 SECTION 2827(a)(3)(B). *Assessment of Environmental Impacts of Expanding the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site.*

NDA Section 2827(a) (3)(B) directs that the Department of the Army conduct an assessment of environmental impacts if land expansion at the PCMS is recommended as the Army's preferred alternative. As stated above, action to gather information and solicit public input to analyze and develop alternatives to expand the PCMS is not possible at this time and remains purely speculative in nature. If OSD were to grant the Army the authority to investigate PCMS expansion alternatives in the future, the Army would proceed by developing informed alternatives with consideration of documented public input as directed by NEPA.

2.4.3 SECTION 2827(a) (3)(C). *Assessment of Costs Associated with Potential Expansion, Including Land Acquisition, Range Improvements, Installation of Utilities, Environmental Restoration, and Other Environmental Activities Associated with the Acquisition.*

NDA Section 2827(a) (3)(C) directs that the Department of the Army conduct an assessment of costs associated with expansion of the PCMS if land expansion is recommended as the Army's preferred alternative. Absent approval by OSD to investigate PCMS expansion, neither a specific proposal for land acquisition nor specific alternatives have been developed. Until those actions are accomplished, costs cannot be assessed.

2.4.4 SECTION 2827(a) (3)(D). *Assessment of Options for Compensating the Local Communities for the Loss of Property Tax Revenue as a Result of the Expansion of the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site.*

NDA Section 2827(a) (3)(D) directs that the Department of the Army conduct an assessment of options for compensating the local communities for lost property tax revenue if land expansion of the PCMS is recommended as the Army's preferred alternative. Determination of lost tax revenue is but one of many socio-economic issues that might be factors in a proposed expansion of PCMS. The affected public would likely consider analysis of these factors as an extremely important part of the NEPA review of any proposed expansion. As stated above, action to gather information and solicit public input to analyze and develop alternatives to expand the PCMS is not possible at this time and remains purely speculative in nature. If OSD were to grant the Army the authority to

investigate PCMS expansion alternatives in the future, the Army would proceed by developing informed alternatives with consideration of public input as directed by NEPA and federal regulations outlined in 32 CFR 651.

2.4.5 SECTION 2827(a) (3)(E). *An Assessment of Whether the Acquisition of Additional Land at the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site Can be Carried Out by the Secretary Solely through Transactions, Including Land Exchanges and the Lease or Purchase of Easements, with Willing Sellers of Privately Held Land.*

NDA Section 2827(a) (3)(E) directs that the Department of the Army conduct an assessment of the feasibility of meeting the Army's training land needs solely through transactions with willing sellers, if land expansion at the PCMS is recommended as the Army's preferred alternative.

Based on the acquisition of the current PCMS and based on public comment that has been provided in response to the Draft Environmental Impact Statements for transformation at Fort Carson and the PCMS, it is highly unlikely that expansion of the PCMS to meet the training requirements outlined in this report could be conducted solely through transactions with willing sellers. The extent any expansion could be conducted with willing sellers is too speculative to determine at this time.

One of the primary reasons for the requirement of public participation in the NEPA process is to ensure that citizens have the opportunity to comment on proposed actions and alternatives that may affect them. As stated above, if the necessary permission is granted to investigate expansion of PCMS, a full NEPA review will be conducted, including the required public participation. The Army will fully consider public input before reaching its final decision on expansion. Further, public input will be available for review by DoD and Congressional officials who will also be involved in the decision process.

Reference Documents Related to this Action

Fort Carson Transformation EIS (anticipated completion date 2007)

Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site Transformation EIS (anticipated completion date 2007)

Final Programmatic EIS for Army Transformation (2002)

Land Use Requirements Study (2005)

Analysis of Alternatives Study (2005)

Final Environmental Impact Statement for Training Land Acquisition (1983)

Army Range and Training Land Strategy (2003)